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EMPLOYER LIABILITY IN WEST VIRGINIA:
COMPENSATION BEYOND THE LAW
Society's dissatisfaction with common law remedies available to employee victims of industrial accidents prompted states to enact workmen's
compensation statutes early in this century.' These statutes typically provided a guaranteed recovery to employees injured in work-related accidents regardless of fault.2 In exchange for these payments, state legislatures granted employers a limited immunity from suit by employees for
damages based on those injuries.' The West Virginia Legislature enacted
At common law, employees could recover compensation for injuries only by prosecuting
tort actions against their employers. See 1 A. LARSON, THE LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION,
§2.20 (1978) [hereinafter cited as LARSON]; W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS, §80 at 526 (4th
ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. Employees obtained recoveries only when they
could establish employer negligence or fault. See Manolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc. W.
Va. _,
246 S.E.2d 907, 910-11 (1978); 1 LARSON, supra at § 2.20; PROSSER, supra § 80 at
527-28. The five common law duties owed by an employer to his employees are (1) to provide
and maintain a reasonably safe place to work, (2) to provide and maintain safe appliances,
tools and equipment, (3) to provide a sufficient number of suitable and competent fellow
employees for safe performance of work, (4) to warn employees of any unusual hazards, and
(5) to create and enforce safety rules. These limitations on employer duties, coupled with the
defenses of the fellow-servant rule, assumption of risk, and contributory negligence, presented
formidable barriers to recovery. See generally 1 LARSON, supraat §§ 4.00, .30; PROSSER, supra
§ 80 at 526. For an analysis of the transition in England from a fault-based compensation
system to strict liability, see McMahon, The Reactions of Tortious Liability To The IndustrialRevolution, 3 Ia. Jan. 18,284 (1968).
Several states adopted workmen's compensation statutes shortly after the turn of this
century so that by 1920, all but eight states had adopted a compensation system. For detailed
accounts of the early developments in workmen's compensation law, see Larson, The Nature
And Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CoRNLL L.Q. 206 (1952); Rhodes, Inception
Of Workmen's CompensationIn The United States, 11 ME. L. REV. 35 (1917).
2 Although employees generally receive compensation payments for accidental injuries
sustained in the course of employment, no compensation is available in some jurisdictions
where the employee intends to injure himself or deliberately and intentionally violates certain
safety statutes. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 25, § 25-5-51 (1975); CAL. LAB. CODE § 5705(c) (West
1971); VA. CODE § 65.1-38(1) (1973); W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2 (1978). Statutory recoveries under
compensation programs generally are considerably lower than similar tort awards, with compensation primarily limited to medical expenses and a percentage of lost earnings. See
generally 2 LARSON, supra note 1, at §§ 57-62.
The cost of workmen's compensation payments fall upon the participating employers.
Although commentators generally state that consumers bear the costs of such programs when
employers set prices for their products, traditional economic analysis suggests that employers
bear at least a portion of these costs. See PRossER, supra note 1, § 80, at 531. Statutory
imposition of workmen's compensation systems on an employer may be likened to a tax upon
that employer because both actions increase the cost of production without increasing productivity. Increased prices charged by the businesses for goods and services reflect the increased
compensation costs. These increased prices will result in a lower level of consumption by the
public according to the principles of supply and demand. To the extent that the decreased
consumption results in a decreased marginal revenue, the employer has suffered a loss due
to the compensation payments. See R. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIc FINANCE IN THEORY AND'PRAcTICE,
396-411 (1973); D. NmER, ECONOMICS OF THE PaoanpTr TAX, 32-40 (1966).
In exchange for participation in the state workmen's compensation systems, state legislatures generally provide a limited immunity from common law actions to employers. See,
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such a compensation plan,' but precluded employers from invoking the
protection of statutory immunity from suit where injury or death results
to an employee from the employer's "deliberate intention". 5 The Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia recently reviewed and subsequently
redefined the deliberate intent exception to the statutory grant of employer
immunity in three cases consolidated for argument and decision:
Manolidis v. Elkins Industries, Inc., Snodgrass v. United States Steel
Corp., and Dishmon v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp.'
In Manolidis v. Elkins Industries, Inc., the plaintiff was injured in the
defendant's manufacturing plant while operating a table saw which was
e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.120 (Vernon Cum.
Supp. 1978); N.M. STAT. ANN. §59-10-5 (1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. §97-10.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4123.74 (Page 1973); W. VA. CODE § 23-2-6 (1978). A number of state
statutory schemes provide some penalty where an employer's misconduct results in an employee's injury. Some states impose additional percentages of the workmen's compensation
awards as penalties for an employer's violation of safety regulations or other misconduct. See,
e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 4553 (West Cum. Supp. 1978); Ky. REv. STAT. §342.165 (1977); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 28 (West 1958); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.120(4) (Vernon Cum. Supp.
1978); N.M. STAT. ANN., § 59-10-7(B) (1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12 (Cum. Supp. 1977);
OHIo CONST. art. II, § 35 (Page 1955); S. C. CODE § 42-9-70 (1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 351-12 (1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.57 (West 1973). Arizona workmen's compensation statutes
withdraw an employer's limited immunity when an employee is injured through his employer's willful misconduct. Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-1022 (Cum. Supp. 1977). Statutes in
Oregon, West Virginia and Washington permit common law actions on behalf of an injured
employee when the employer deliberately intends to cause injury to the employee and thus
fully withdraw the grant of employer immunity. OR. Rxv. STAT. § 656.156(2) (1977); WASH.
Rxv. CODE ANN. § 51.24.020 (Cum. Supp. 1977); W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2 (1978). Texas withdraws an employer's statutory immunity only where the employer's willful misconduct or
gross negligence results in an employee's death. TEx. REv. Cirv. STAT. ANN.- art. 8306, § 5
(Vernon 1967).
The West Virginia workmen's compensation statutes provide a limited immunity from
employee tort suits to qualified employers participating in the state's workmen's compensation program. W. VA. CODE § 23-2-6 (1978). These statutes also extend this limited immunity
to every officer, manager, agent, representative or employee of the employer while acting in
furtherance of the employer's business interests. W. VA. CODE § 23-2-6a (1978).
' W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2 (1978). The West Virginia workmen's compensation statutes
withdraw the grant of immunity where the employer deliberately intends to cause injury to
an employee. Id. Section 23-4-2 states in relevant part:
If injury or death result to any employee from the deliberate intention of his
employer to produce such injury or death, the employee, the widow, widower, child
or dependent of the employee shall have the privilege to take under this chapter,
and shall also have cause of action against the employer, as if this chapter had not
been enacted, for any excess of damages over the amount received or receivable
under this chapter.
Although the provision permits an employee to maintain a common law action against
the employer, the statute also permits the employee to receive any workmen's compensation
benefits to which he is entitled.
I
W. Va. , 246 S.E.2d 907 (1978). Justice McGraw inadvertantly misspelled
throughout the court's opinion the name of the plaintiff as "Mandolidis". See Brief on Behalf
of James Manolidis and June Manolidis, Plaintiffs in Error, Manolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc.,
W. Va. -,
246 S.E.2d 907 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Manolidis Brief]. Justices
Neely and Miller also adopted the misspelling in their opinions. This author will adhere to
the proper spelling.
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not equipped with a safety guard.7 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant's failure to provide a safety guard for the saw constituted violations
of both federal and state safety regulations' and that the employer had
actual knowledge of the consequences of such an omission due to prior
employee injuries of a similar nature.' The plaintiff also maintained that,
although federal safety inspectors had withdrawn the saw from operation
for lack of a proper safety guard, the employer had ordered workers to
operate the saw without a guard to improve efficiency and thereby increase
production and profits. Shortly after the employer's order, the plaintiffs
injury resulted."0
In Snodgrass v. United States Steel Corp., several employees sustained
serious injuries and one employee died when a temporary building platform used in the construction of a bridge collapsed. The .platform was
dislodged from its supports when a heavy wire cable was dragged across
it, causing both the platform and the employees working on the platform
to fall into a gorge below." The plaintiffs in Snodgrass alleged that their
employer negligently and willfully violated certain safety regulations regarding the construction of such temporary platforms and failed to provide
adequate safety precautions for employees working on the platform.'
In Dishmon v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp., the plaintiff's, decedent
7 Manolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc.,

W. Va.

-

246 S.E.2d 907, 914 (1978).

-,

Id. at _-, 246 S.E.2d at 914-15; Manolidis Brief, supra note 6, at 17.
Manolidis alleged that the defendant had actual knowledge of the likely consequences
of the omission of the safety guard from the table saw because several other employees,
including plaintiff's son, previously had injured themselves while working with such unW. Va.
guarded saws in the defendant's plant. Manolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907, 914-15 (1978); Manolidis Brief, supra note 6, at 19-20.
"1

Manolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc.,

-

W. Va.

__

246 S.E.2d 907, 914-15 (1978).

Manolidis contended that his employer threatened to fire him if he refused to operate the
unguarded saw. Id. at _ 246 S.E.2d at 914-15; Manolidis Brief, supra note 6, at 5. The
plaintiff demonstrated his employer's knowledge of the unreasonably dangerous condition of
the saw through depositions showing repeated complaints by union shop stewards and safety
246 S.E.2d 907, 914-16; Manolidis
W. Va. _
inspectors about the unguarded saws. Brief, supra note 6, at 20.
" A group of employees, and the wife of one deceased employee, brought the Snodgrass
action against the American Bridge Division of United States Steel Corp. The company built
a work-platform across a gorge to facilitate the construction of a bridge. One of the employees
of the defendant accidently dislodged the platform with a heavy wire cable while operating a
W.
crane, sending the employees falling into the gorge. Manolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907, 916 (1978); Brief, Appeal From the Circuit Court of Kanawha
Va. -,
County, West Virginia, at 2-3, Snodgrass v. United States Steel Corp., - W. Va. -_, 246
S.E.2d 907 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Snodgrass Brief]; Brief of Appellee United States
, 246 S.E.2d 907
W. Va. Steel Corp., at 4, Snodgrass v. United States Steel Corp., (1978) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Steel Brief].
11The plaintiffs in Snodgrass alleged that the defendant willfully violated certain safety
regulations governing the construction of temporary work-platforms and, therefore, rendered
the platforms patently dangerous. Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that the company violated numerous regulations by failing to provide safety nets and lifelines on the-platform.
These willful safety violations, the plaintiffs argued, constituted deliberate intent to injure
within the meaning of W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2 (1978). Manolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., , 246 S.E.2d 907, 916-17 (1978); Snodgrass Brief, supra note 11, at 3-5.
W. Va.
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was killed while working in a mine when a portion of the slate ceiling and.
a roof support fell and crushed him. " In her wrongful death action, the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant had deliberately violated certain mine
safety regulations concerning roof supports and underground blasting. 4
Furthermore, the plaintiff contended that the employer deliberately, willfully, and wantonly permitted its employees to work under extremely hazardous conditions and that the employer's misconduct was the proximate
cause of her decedent's death. 5
The plaintiffs in all three cases maintained that their employers had
deliberately intended to injure the employees 6 and, therefore, were precluded from invoking the limited immunity granted to employers by state
workmen's compensation statutes. In each case, the trial court had dismissed the action on the pleadings, finding that the plaintiffs could not
demonstrate the deliberate intent necessary to defeat the employers' immunity." The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the
decisions and remanded the cases to permit the plaintiffs to establish
*deliberate intent at trial. 9 The Supreme Court held that where genuine
issues of fact exist and a liberal reading of the complaint states a basis for
relief, the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure forbid pre-trial disposition of an action."0 In each of the three cases, the court found that the
," The defendant coal company'in Dishmon allegedly used explosives illegally to clear a
rock fall in one of its mines. Shortly after the explosions, the plaintiff's decedent was sent to
work in clearing the area. Soon thereafter, one of the rib roof supports fell into the area, killing
the decedent and two others. W. Va.
, 246 S.E.2d at 919; Brief on Behalf of Appellant, at 1-2, Dishmon v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp., W. Va. _
246 S.E.2d 907
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Dishmon Brief]; Brief on Behalf of Eastern Associated Coal
Corp., Appellee, at 4, Dishmon v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp., W. Va. -, 246
S.E.2d 907 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Eastern Coal Brief).
-1
W. Va.__, 246 S.E.2d at 919-20; Dishmon Brief, supra note 13, at 2-3, 16-21;
Eastern Coal Brief, supra note 13, at 5.
5

-

W. Va.

-,

246 S.E.2d at 919-20. Although the plaintiff in Dishmon alleged

willful and deliberate violations of several federal and state safety regulations, she made no
argument that such violations were deliberately intended to cause injury or death to the
employees. Eastern Coal Brief, supra note 13, at 5-6. On appeal, the Manolidis court held
that this omission did not render the plaintiff's complaint defective because a fair reading of
the complaint implied an allegation of deliberate intent. W. Va. -, 246 S.E.2d at 920.
Manolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., W. Va. _, 246 S.E.2d 907, 910 (1978).
' See text accompanying note 5 supra.
Manolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., W. Va. _., 246 S.E.2d 907, 916, 917, 920 (1978).
, Id. at

-

, 246 S.E.2d at 918-21.

In Manolidis and Snodgrass, the trial courts' consideration of affidavits and depositions submitted in support of the defendants' motions to dismiss converted those motions into
motions for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure. Manolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., W. Va. -,
246 S.E.2d 907, 917 (1978);
see Wilfong v. Wilfong, 156 W. Va. 754, 756, 197 S.E.2d 96, 98 (1973). Since the plaintiff's
allegations presented genuine issues of fact concerning the employers' alleged deliberate
intent to injure, the Manolidis court held on appeal that disposition of Manolidis and
Snodgrass by summary judgment was inappropriate. W. Va. -,
246 S.E.2d at 91819. The Manolidis court stated that the employees in both cases must have an opportunity
to present evidence at trial which would support an inference of deliberate intent. Id.
The Manolidis court viewed the defendant's motion to dismiss in Dishmon as a motion
2
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plaintiffs adequately alleged that the employers had deliberately intended
to injure the employees. 21 The Manolidis court held that the statutory
grant of immunity did not interfere with a plaintiff's right to establish
evidence of an employer's intent at trial.2 Therefore, the immunity provision does not operate to protect an employer from suit, but merely protects
him from adverse judgments where deliberate intent is not established at
trial.?
The Manolidis court not only remanded the three cases on procedural
grounds, but also substantively redefined the deliberate intent language of
the employer immunity exception.24 The court held that an employer loses
statutory immunity from common law liability when his conduct constitutes an intentional tort or willful, wanton, and reckless misconduct.?
, 246
W. Va. pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. S.E.2d at 920. The Rule states that a court should construe pleadings to achieve substantial
justice. W. VA. R. Civ. P. 8. Therefore, where a liberal reading of the complaint discloses a
ground for relief, a court should not dismiss the suit. -See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 4548 (1957); Williams v. Wheeling Steel Corp., 266 F. Supp. 651, 654 .(N.D. W. Va. 1967);
W. Va. _, 246 S.E.2d 907, 920 (1978); Chapman v.
Manolidis v. Elkins Indus. Inc., _..-, 236 S.E.2d 207, 212 (1977). Since the plaintiff in
W. Va.
Kane Transfer Co., Dishmon could establish deliberate intent at trial through proof of the employer's willful
misconduct, the Manolidis court found that the trial court improperly dismissed the Dishmon
246 S.E.2d
suit on the pleadings alone. Manolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., - W. Va. _
907, 921 (1978).
21 See note 20 supra.
2 Prior to Manolidis, courts construed the immunity provisions of West Virginia's workmen's compensation statutes as requiring a trial court to screen common law actions against
employers where the plaintiff's affidavits and depositions did not establish the employer's
W.'Va.
deliberate intent to injure the employee. See Manolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., W. Va.
, 246 S.E.2d 907, 923-24 (1978) (Neely, J., dissenting); Eisnaugle v. Booth, _ 226 S.E.2d 259, 260 (1976); Brewer v. Appalachian Constr., Inc., 135 W. Va. 739, 748,
65 S.E.2d 87, 93 (1951); Allen v. Raleigh-Wyoming Mining Co., 117 W. Va. 631, 637, 186 S.E.
612, 614 (1936); Maynard v. Island Creek Coal Co., 115 W. Va. 249, 250-51, 175 S.E. 70, 71
(1934); Collins v. Dravo Contracting Co., 114 W. Va. 229, 236, 171 S.E. 757, 759-60 (1933).
" The Manolidis court construed the West Virginia workmen's compensation statute,
which provides employers with a limited immunity, as effectively making the qualifying
employer judgment-proof. Section 23-2-6 of the West Virginia Code states in relevant part:
Any employer subject to this chapter who shall subscribe and pay into the
workmen's compensation fund the premiums provided by this chapter or who shall
elect to make direct payments of compensation as herein provided, shall not be
liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute for the injury or death
of an employee, however occurring ...
Although an employer is not liable in damages for accidental injuries to an employee by
virtue of this section, the Manolidis court held that this statute did not operate to protect an
employer from the litigation process itself when a plaintiff alleges deliberate intent under W.
W. Va. -, 246 S.E.2d 907,
VA. CoDE § 23-4-2 (1978). Manolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 918-19, 921 (1978). See generally notes 4 & 5 supra;see also Note, Workmen's Compensation-The DeliberateIntent Statute: Providing For The Victims of Industry?, 72 W. VA. L.
REv. 90 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Providing For The Victims?].
, 246 S.E.2d at 926,
246 S.E.2d at 910-14. But see id. at W. Va. ,
21 See (Miller, J., concurring. Justice Miller did not believe that the court redefined the construction of the immunity statute in Manolidis.
, 246 S.E.2d 907, 914 (1978).
W. Va. _
2 Manolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., -
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Although prior constructions of the statutory language had required proof
of an employer's specific intent to injure an employee, 6 the Manolidis
court rejected such a reading of the statute. The court held that where an
employer acts with a knowledge or consciousness that his conduct creates
a substantial risk of bodily injury, the employer may not invoke the statutory immunity to protect himself from employee suits." Furthermore, the
court noted that such knowledge may be shown by an employer's familiarity with relevant safety regulations and evidence of prior injuries or deaths
resulting from the employer's conduct. 2 Finally, the Manolidis court sugtrial judge, should determine
gested that the fact-finder, rather than the
2
the culpability of an employer's conduct. 1
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia first attempted to
define the deliberate intent language which limits employer immunity in
Collins v. Dravo Contracting Co. " Although the Collins court failed to
adopt a specific construction of "deliberate intent", 3' the court did note
that the term might encompass an employer's failure to perform a legal
duty in addition to an affirmative act.'2 Thus, the court announced that
when a plaintiff alleges that his employer deliberately intended to cause
an injury through an omission, the plaintiff may introduce evidence of the
employer's intent at trial.3 Less than one year after Collins, the court rethe deliberate intent provision in Maynard v. Island Creek Coal
considered
Co. 34 Although the Maynard court also declined to define deliberate intent,3 the court rejected the plaintiffs contention that gross negligence
alone is sufficient to establish an employer's deliberate intent and thereby
expose the employer to common law liability for employee injuries?6 The
25 See

text accompanying notes 39-41, 49-50 infra.

246 S.E.2d 907, 914 (1978).
W. Va. -,
v Manolidis v. Elkins Indus. Inc., -, 246 S.E.2d at 914 n.10.
21 Id. at
21 The Manolidis court implied that a jury ultimately should determine the culpability
of an employer's conduct in deciding whether the employer acted with a deliberate intention
to injure. The court interpreted two prior decisions, Collins v. Dravo Contracting Co., 114
W. Va. 229, 171 S.E. 757 (1933) and Maynard v. Island Creek Coal Co., 115 W. Va. 249, 175
S.E. 70 (1934), as clearly endorsing such a delegation to the jury. Manolidis v. Elkins Indus.,
W. Va. -, 246 S.E.2d 907, 912 (1978). While altering the specific intent construcInc., tion developed in Allen v. Raleigh-Wyoming Mining Co., 117 W. Va. 631, 186 S.E. 612 (1936),
the Manolidis court explicitly affirmed the interpretations placed on the statutory language
, 246 S.E.2d at 913.
W. Va. by the Collins and Maynard courts. 10 114 W. Va. 229, 171 S.E. 757 (1933); see text accompanying notes 56-63 infra.
11The Collins court reviewed several definitions of intent without applying any single
definition to the deliberate intent language which governs employer liability. The court noted
that a man might be presumed to intend the ordinary and usual consequences of his actions
but pointed out that other definitions of intent require the existence of actual malice. Id. at
234, 171 S.E. at 759.
1 Id., 171 S.E. at 759.
1 Id., 171 S.E. at 759.
u 115 W. Va. 249, 175 S.E. 70 (1934); see text accompanying notes 64-72 infra.
3 Rather than adopting any definition of deliberate intent, the Maynard court devoted
much of its opinion to outlining conduct beyond the scope of the statutory language, such as
gross negligence. 115 W. Va. at 252-53, 175 S.E. at 72. See also text accompanying notes 6472 infra.
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court did acknowledge, however, that extremely wanton or reckless misconduct by an employer might warrant a finding of the requisite intent
where the employee's injury flows naturally from the employer's misconduct.37 Nevertheless, the Maynard court placed a heavy burden on plain38
tiffs by requiring "clear and forceful" evidence to support such a finding.
39
In Allen v. Raleigh-Wyoming Mining Co., the court defined the deliberate

intent language for the first time and held that an employer loses his
statutory immunity only when he specifically intends to injure an employee, and injury in fact results."0 The specific intent construction developed in Allen thus required courts to focus on the employer's underlying
intent rather than merely on his conduct.4'
The Manolidis court's construction of the statute rejects the specific
3 The Maynard court stated that under some circumstances a trial court might imply
the requisite intent from the employer's conduct. The Maynard court stated:
It may be that the carelessness, indifference and negligence of an employer may
be so wanton as to warrant a judicial determination that his ulterior intent was to
inflict injury. But in the very nature of things, a showing which would warrant such
a finding would have to be clear and forceful in high degree.
115 W. Va. at 253, 175 S.E. at 72. Thus, the Maynard court limited the cases in which a trial
court might imply intent to particularly egregious employer misconduct. The plaintiff carried
a heavy burden in making such a showing, as the evidentiary standard imposed by the court
was severe.
31See note 37 supra.

31117 W. Va. 631, 186 S.E. 612 (1936). The plaintiff in Allen was injured while riding
into a coal mine on a train of empty coal cars. As the train passed into the mine, the plaintiff
was struck by a trap aoor recently installed over the tracks. The plaintiff contended that
because the defendant had knowledge of the dangerous location of the trap door, but failed
to take any precautions other than warning the plaintiff of the door's existence, the injury
resulted from the employer's deliberate intent. Id. at 632-33, 186 S.E. at 612.
4o Id. at 632-33, 186 S.E. at 612. The Allen court relied heavily on the judicial interpretations of similar deliberate intent statutes in Oregon and Washington in construing W. VA.
CODE § 23-4-2 (1978). WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 51.24.020 (Cum. Supp. 1977). OR. REv. STAT.
§ 656.156 (1977).
The Allen court expressly adopted the definition of deliberate intent developed in Jenkins v. Carman Mfg. Co., 79 Or. 448, 155 P. 703 (1916). The plaintiff in Jenkins was injured
when a defective piece of machinery in the defendant's sawmill hurled some lumber which
struck the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had knowledge of the defect in
the machine and recognized the potential danger to employees but failed to repair or replace
the equipment. The employee contended that the defendant's conduct constituted deliberate
intent to injure within the meaning of the Oregon immunity statute. Id. at 449-50, 155 P. at
704. The Jenkins court, however, construed the statute to include only those employee injuries caused by an employer's specific intent to produce such an injury. The court stated:
We think by the words "deliberate intention to produce the injury" that the
lawmakers meant to imply that the employer must have determined to injure an
employ' and used some means appropriate to that end; that there must be specific
intent, and not mere carelessness or negligence, however gross.
Id. at 453-54, 155 P. at 705. The justification behind the imposition of a specific intent
standard in construing the immunity statutes is the non-accidental nature of an employee's
injury as a critical element of a common-law tort action. Therefore, an employer should not
forfeit statutory immunity from suits where accidental injuries to employees are caused by
the employer's gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct. See generally 2A LARSON,
supra note 1, at § 68.13; Providing For The Victims?, supra note 23, at 96.
11See note 40 supra.
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intent requirement established in Allen 2 and directly conflicts with the
intent of the West Virginia Legislature. 3 On review of the statute, the
court failed to apply three principles of statutory construction which aid a
court in ascertaining and implementing legislative intent. First, where the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, a court should give effect
to that language." The phrase "deliberate intent to injure" denotes a specific intent to produce injury and focuses on the employer's state of mind
rather than his conduct,45 a focus dispensed with in Manolidis. Second,
when a legislature adopts a statute from another jurisdiction, the construction given by that jurisdiction normally will control."8 Washington adopted
a provision in its first workmen's compensation act 47 on which West Vir-

ginia and several other states patterned their employer immunity statutes." Jurisdictions which have construed the deliberate intent language
consistently have required a showing of specific intent to injure before
withdrawing an employer's immunity."8 The Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia itself adopted a specific intent construction of the statute
in Allen and applied that construction repeatedly for over forty years. 50
" See text accompanying notes 49-50 infra.

4 See text accompanying notes 44-53 infra.
" A court's purpose in construing a statute is to give effect to the will of the legislature.
See, e.g., Manolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., W. Va..,
246 S.E.2d 907, 910 (1978); Vest
v. Cobb, 138 W. Va. 660, 684, 76 S.E.2d 885, 898 (1953); Richardson v. State Comp. Comm'r,
137 W. Va. 819, 834, 74 S.E.2d 258, 261 (1953); State ex. rel. Cosner v. See, 129 W. Va. 722,
743, 42 S.E.2d 31, 43 (1947); State ex rel. Lawhead v. Kanawba County Court, 129 W. Va.
167, 172, 38 S.E.2d 879, 900 (1946); McVey v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 103 W. Va.
519, 523, 138 S.E. 97, 98 (1927); 2A C. SANDS, SuTRLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUcTION, § 45.05
(4th ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Sutherland]. Where the language of a statute is clear
and unambiguous, a court should give effect to that language. See, e.g., State ex rel. Fox v.
Board of Trustees of Policemen's Pension or Relief Fund, 148 W. Va. 369, 373-74, 135 S.E.2d
262, 264-65 (1964); State ex. rel. Hardesty v. Aracoma-Chief Logan No. 4253, V.F.W., 147
W. Va. 645, 649-50, 129 S.E.2d 921, 924 (1963); State v. Chittester, 139 W. Va. 268, 272, 79
S.E.2d 845, 846-47 (1954); Barnhart v. State Comp. Comm'r, 128 W. Va. 29, 32, 35 S.E.2d
686, 687 (1945); 2A SutrLaNL.D, supra at §§ 46.01, .04.
"I Allen v. Raleigh-Wyoming Mining Co., 117 W. Va. 631, 632-33, 186 S.E. 612, 612-13
(1936); Brief as Amicus Curiae of the West Virginia Farm Bureau, at 13-14, Manolidis v.
Elkins Indus., Inc.,
- W. Va.
_ 246 S.E.2d 907 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Farm
Bureau Brief]; Brief as Amicus Curiae of the West Virginia Mfrs. Ass'n Opposing the Position of Appellants, at 6, Manolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., - W. Va. , 246 S.E.2d 907
(1978) [hereinafter cited as West Virginia Mfrs. Ass'n Brief]; United States Steel Brief,
supra note 11, at 18-19; Eastern Coal Brief, supra note 13, at 24-25.
46 See, e.g., State ex rel. Wadsworth v. Southern Surety Co., 221 Ala. 113, _,
127 So.
805, 810 (1930); Duval v. Hunt, 34 Fla. 85, _
, 15 So. 876, 882 (1894); Todd v. State, 228
Ga. 746, , 187 S.E.2d 831, 834 (1972); Saint Joseph Hosp. v. Quinn, 241 Md. 371, ,
216 A.2d 732, 735 (1966); Piatkowski v. Mok, 29 Mich. App. 426, _ 185 N.W.2d 413, 414
n.1 (1971); General Acc'd Fire & Life Ins. Corp. v. Cohen, 203 Va. 810, 813, 127 S.E.2d 399,
401 (1962). See generally Allen v. Raleigh-Wyoming Mining Co., 117 W. Va. 631, 186 S.E.
612 (1936); 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 44, at § 52.02.
," WASH. Rav. CODE ANN. § 51.24.020 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
" See note 40 supra.
,1 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Carman Mfg. Co., 79 Or. 448, 453-54, 155 P. 703, 705 (1916);
Delthony v. Standard Furn. Co., 205 P. 379, 379-80 (Wash. 1922). See also note 86 infra.
1 See Eisnaugle v. Booth, W. Va. __,
226 S.E.2d 259 (1976); Brewer v. Appa-
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Third, when a statute has received practical application by the courts and
subsequently is reenacted by the legislature, the contemporaneous application is presumptively correct. 5' The West Virginia Legislature reenacted
the limited immunity provision without modification subsequent to Allen
and thereby impliedly approved the court's construction of the deliberate
intent language.2 Furthermore, the legislature has rejected repeated at-3
tempts to amend the statute to provide expanded employer liability.
Such legislative attention serves to reinforce the past judicial constructions
of the statutory language. Since the legislative intent underlying the statute is clear, the legislature itself should be the source of any change in the
application of the deliberate intent exception to employer immunity.
In rejecting the Allen construction of deliberate intent despite the principle of stare decisis, 4 the Manolidis court placed great weight on both the
lachian Constr., Inc., 135 W. Va. 739, 65 S.E.2d 87 (1951); Allen v. Raleigh-Wyoming Mining
Co., 117 W. Va. 631, 186 S.E. 612 (1936).
11State ex rel. Zirk v. Muntzing, 146 W. Va. 349, 357-58, 120 S.E.2d 260, 265 (1961);
Parsons v. County Court of Roane County, 92 W. Va. 490, 497, 115 S.E. 473, 476 (1922);
accord, Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 339 (1969); State v. McKenney, 268 Ala. 165, -,
166
105 So.2d 439, 443 (1958); State ex rel. Auto. Mach. Co. v. Brown, 121 Ohio St. 73, -,
N.E. 903, 904 (1929). See generally 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 44, at § 49.09. Courts have
held that a particular statutory construction may be reexamined to correct any errors in
interpretation, even after subsequent reenactment by a legislature. See, e.g., Boys Market,
Inc., v. Retail Clerks, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1970); James v. United States, 366
U.S. 213, 220 (1961); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940). See generally 46 COLUM.
L. REV. 886 (1946); 31 M!IN. L. REV. 625 (1947).
See note 51 supra.
The West Virginia Legislature repeatedly has considered and refused to enact legislation which would expand employer liability beyond the present workmen's compensation
statute, W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2 (1978). One proposal, introduced in 1969, and again in 1970,
would have denied employer immunity where an employee is injured as a result of the
employer's willful, wanton, or reckless misconduct, or the employer's violation of any state
safety statute or regulation. S. 30, 59th W. Va. Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (1969); S. 7, 59th W. Va.
Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (1970); H. 545, 59th W. Va. Leg., 2d Reg. Seass. (1970). A second series
of proposals, introduced in 1973 and 1974, would have denied employer immunity when the
employer's disregard of a known and preventable health or safety hazard causes injury to an
employee. S. 213, 61st W. Va. Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (1973); H. 1037, 61st W. Va. Leg., 1st Reg.
Sess. (1973); S. 424, S. 487, S. 510, H. 1096, H. 1215, H. 1330, 61st W. Va. Leg., 2d Reg. Sess.
(1974). In 1975 and 1976, several other legislative proposals would have established a presumption of an employer's deliberate intent to produce injury where an employer's violation
of statutory, regulatory, or contractual safety provisions injures an employee. S. 435, H. 1189,
62nd W. Va. Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (1976). Most recently, the legislature considered a proposal
which would have denied employer immunity in any case where an employer's negligence
causes injury to an employee. This proposal also limited the common law damages recoverable to the difference between the receivable disability payments and the employee's usual
wages. H. 1522, 63rd W. Va. Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (1977). See generally-EasternCoal Brief,
supra note 13, at Appendix 1.
" The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia demonstrated its lack of concern for
the doctrine of stare decisis in a case involving trespass damages, Jarrett v. E. L. Harper &
Son, Inc.,

-

W. Va.

-,

235 S.E.2d 362 (1977). In Jarrett, the trespassing defendant

company destroyed the plaintiff's water well while building a sewer for a public service
235
district, leaving the plaintiff and his family without water for five weeks. Id. at -,
S.E.2d at 363. Prior West Virginia decisions drew a distinction between permanent and
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Collins and Maynard decisions. 5 The plaintiff's decedent in Collins was
killed while working in an excavation under an overhanging earthen bank
which suddenly collapsed and buried the decedent. 5 The plaintiff alleged
that although the employer knew that the bank was likely to collapse, he
failed to warn the decedent, sending the employee to work under the bank
with the deliberate intent to cause injury.57 Although the Collins court
primarily addressed the issue of pleading a deliberate intent action against
an employer," the court also held that an employer may deliberately intend to injure an employee through an omission. 5 The Collins court, however, clearly focused on the employer's mental state at the time of the
omission rather than on his conduct." The court noted that the employer's
foreman allegedly knew that the bank was about to collapse and, with that
temporary property damage in trespass actions before assessing and awarding consequential
damages. Compare O'Dell v. McKenzie, 150 W. Va. 346, 350, 145 S.E.2d 388, 391 (1965),
Jones v. Pennsylvania R.R., 138 W. Va. 191, 195-96, 75 S.E.2d 103, 105-6 (1953), and
McHenry v. City of Parkersburg, 66 W. Va. 533, 535, 66 S.E. 750, 751 (1909) with Severt v.
Beckley Coals, Inc., 153 W. Va. 600, 610-11, 170 S.E.2d 577, 583 (1969) and Malamphy v.
Potomac Edison Co., 140 W. Va. 269, 279, 83 S.E.2d 755, 761 (1954). The plaintiff in Jarrett,
however, sought damages not only for the cost of replacing the well, but also for his aggravation and inconvenience. Jarrett v. E. L. Harper & Son, Inc., W. Va.
, 235 S.E.2d
362, 365 (1977). The Jarrettcourt responded by over-ruling all prior cases which recognized
such a distinction and held that the plaintiff could recover damages for aggravation and
inconvenience notwithstanding the temporary nature of the proprty damage. Id. at -, 235
S.E.2d at 365. Thus, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia does not appear to accord
great persuasive power to the doctrine of stare decisis.
A distinction may be drawn in the application of stare decisis between matters of statutory interpretation and common law. The weight of stare decisis should be stronger in a case
involving statutory interpretation than in a situation concerning common law. The courts
themselves develop the common law, which is subject to reevaluation and alteration in light
of society's changing circumstances. Where a court is construing a statute, however, the court
should give effect to the will of the legislature. See note 44 supra. The changes in the substance of a statute generally should emanate from the legislature rather than the court. See
Maynard v. Island Creek Coal Co., 115 W. Va. 249, 252, 175 S.E. 70, 72 (1934).
Manolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., W. Va. _ , 246 S.E.2d 907, 911-12 (1978).
Collins v. Dravo Contracting Co., 114 W. Va. 229, 230-31, 171 S.E. 757, 757 (1933).
17Id., 171 S.E. at 757.
s The trial court in Collins dismissed the plaintiff's action because the pleadings failed
to demonstrate the employer's deliberate intent to injure. On appeal, the court primarily
addressed the procedural issue of the sufficiency of a pleading that alleges an employer's
deliberate intent to injure an employee. Id. at 235, 171 S.E. at 759.
Id. at 234, 171 S.E. at 759.
The Collins court focused on the underlying specific intent of the employer rather than
merely evaluating his conduct. The court stated:
If the defendant permitted the conditions set forth in the declaration to exist; if
they were conditions that would naturally result in injury or death to its employees,
... if the defendant ... knew full well that such conditions existed, then ...
we cannot see why the very conditions alleged ... might not have been permitted
to continue with the deliberate intent on the part of the employer, and with a
design, that their continuance should cause injury or death or both to its employees.
Id. at 234-35, 171 S.E. at 757. Thus, the Collins court required more than mere misconduct
to support a finding of deliberate intent. The court required some specific scheme to cut off
employer immunity.
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knowledge, sent the decedent to work under that bank.6' The certain result
of the foreman's act was the employee's death.2 Since the employer's
actions seemed certain to result in injury to an employee, the Collins court
admitted such misconduct as evidence of the employer's underlying intent.

3

In Maynard, the plaintiff also alleged that her decedent's death resulted from the employer's deliberate intention. 4 When making repairs on
a coal conveyor, an employee of the defendant negligently failed to remove
a protruding bolt near an opening of the conveyor." While walking over a
covered portion of the conveyor, the decedent stumbled on this bolt, fell
into the conveyor, and was killed.6 Although the plaintiff contended that
the defendant acted willfully, deliberately, and unlawfully in permitting
the conveyor to fall into disrepair,67 the Maynard court found that the
employer did not deliberately intend to injure the employee. 6 The court
stated that under particularly egregious circumstances, an employer's conduct could be so wanton as to warrant a judicial determination of intent. 9
Nonetheless, the court focused primarily on the employer's mental state
and noted that his conduct served only as evidence of the underlying
intent.7 0 Thus, the Maynard court ruled that "[t]he result of the
[decedent's] stumbling was characterized by fortuitousness rather than
by anticipated sequence" and, therefore, the employer's conduct was insufficient to support a finding of deliberate intent.7 The Maynard court
imposed a strict evidentiary standard by accepting an employer's conduct
as indicative of his intent only where the injury flowed naturally from the
misconduct."
The Manolidis decision shifts the focus of the trial court from the employer's intent to his conduct. The Manolidis court held that where an
Id. at 234-35, 171 S.E. at 757.
Id., 171 S.E. at 757.
63The court admitted the employer's misconduct in Collins as evidence of the underlying
intent, but required additional evidence to support a finding of specific intent. See id. at 235,
61
32

171 S.E. at 757. See also note 60 supra.
" Maynard v. Island Creek Coal Co., 115 W. Va. 249, 251, 175 S.E. 70, 71 (1934).
" Id. at 250-51, 175 S.E. at 71.

" Id., 175 S.E. at 71.

Id., 175 S.E. at 71.
0 Id. at 253, 175 S.E. at 72.
" The Maynard court alluded to a set of circumstances in which an employer's misconduct might warrant a judicial finding of deliberate intent to injure. The court stated:
It may be that the carelessness, indifference and negligence of an employer may be
so wanton as to warrant a judicial determination that his ulterior intent was to
inflict injury. But in the very nature of things, a showing which would warrant such
a finding would have to be clear and forceful in high degree.
Id., 175 S.E. at 72. Thus, the Maynard court limited the circumstances in which a court may
infer deliberate intent to certain special cases of egregious employer misconduct. The misconduct apparently must have reasonably certain and generally accepted consequences before a
court could presume intent.
70Id., 175 S.E. at 72.
71Id., 175 S.E. at 72. See also note 69 supra.
6

n Maynard v. Island Creek Coal Co., 115 W. Va. 249, 253, 175 S.E. 70, 72 (1934).
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employer deliberately engages in misconduct with the knowledge that his
misconduct creates a substantial risk of injury to employees, the employer
may not invoke the statutory immunity of the workmen's compensation
statutes. 3 An employee may prove the employer's willful misconduct
merely by showing that the employer deliberately violated state or federal
safety regulations.7" The Manolidis decision then requires that the factfinder plunge into risk analysis to weigh the probability of employee injury
resulting from the employer misconduct. 5 If the fact-finder determines
that the violation created a "strong" probability of injury, 78 the employer
may not invoke the statutory immunity and may be exposed to common
law liability." Under the Manolidis holding, a trial court need not evaluate
an employer's specific intent to injure the employee. Rather, the deliberate
violation of safety statutes coupled with an employer's knowledge of the
78
probable consequences create liability.
Although Manolidis certainly will increase the number of personal injury suits based on work-related injuries 7 the extent to which the decision
will actually expand employer liability is unclear. The court plainly indicated that an employer's willful violation of a safety statute alone will not
warrant a recovery." The court held that a plaintiff also must show that
the employer's conduct created a great risk of injury.' In this regard, the
only mitigating standard cited by the Manolidis court requires a "strong
probability that injury may result" before imposing liability. 2 Nevertheless, the violation of a safety statute itself might raise a general presumption that injury is likely to result." The extent to which employers will
suffer adverse judgments, therefore, depends largely upon future judicial
determinations of the actionable level of the risk of injury. By striking the
specific intent requirement of the deliberate intent provision, the
Manolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., W. Va..,
246 S.E.2d 907, 914 (1978).
7, See id. at -,
246 S.E.2d at 914 n.10.
SId. at _
246 S.E.2d at 925 (Miller, J., concurring).
7' Id. at _,
246 S.E.2d at 914. The Manolidis court looked to the Second Restatement
of Torts to establish the standard of liability in deliberate intent actions and elaborated that
a plaintiff must show a greater probability of injury to establish deliberate intent than that
necessary to prove negligence. Id. at _,
246 S.E.2d at 914. See also PROSSER, supranote 1,
§ 500, Comment f. at 590.
Manolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., - W. Va. _,
246 S.E.2d 907, 914 (1978).
75 Id. at -,
246 S.E.2d at 914. See also Stone v. Rudolph, 127 W. Va. 335, 346, 32
S.E.2d 742, 748 (1944).
", See Manolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., W. Va. _
246 S.E.2d 907, 922-23 (1978)
(Neely, J., dissenting). But see id. at -, 246 S.E.2d at 926 (Miller, J., concurring).
'Id. at -'
246 S.E.2d at 914.
"1 Id. at -,
246 S.E.2d at 914.
82 Id. at
, 246 S.E.2d at 914. See also note 76 supra.
83 Legislatures and regulatory agencies draft safety statutes to protect workers from
industrial accidents. Deliberate violation of such provisions by employers presumptively
indicates a willingness to risk employee injuries. Justice Neely, however, cogently pointed out
that traditional common sense safety practices have become elaborate codifications of industrial safety practices. With the immense number of safety rules and regulations, virtually
every accident involves some sort of safety violation. Manolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., W. Va.__, 246 S.E.2d 907, 922-23 (1978) (Neely, J., dissenting).
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Manolidis court sought to subject a broader class of employer misconduct
to judicial scrutiny and potential common law liability."' West Virginia
employers may no longer risk employee injuries by cutting comers with
safety regulations and invoke workmen's compensation immunity from
common law actions by employees. 5
By expanding the deliberate intent limitation on employer immunity,
the Manolidis court rejected a statutory construction which had been judicially applied for over forty years.88 While the court and legal commentaU Prior West Virginia decisions held that willful misconduct did not constitute deliberate
intent within the meaning of W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2. See Eisnaugle v. Booth, -W. Va. -,
226 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1976); Brewer v. Appalachian Constr., Inc., 135 W. Va. 739, 750, 65
S.E.2d 87, 94 (1951). Despite language to the contrary, Manolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., W. Va. _ 246 S.E.2d 907, 926 (1978) (Miller, J., concurring), the Manolidisdecision may
abolish any distinction between gross negligence and willful misconduct through the riskanalysis approach. Gross negligence consistently has been held insufficient to cut off an
W. Va. _,
226 S.E.2d 259,
employer's statutory immunity. See Eisnaugle v. Booth, 261 (1976); Brewer v. Appalachian Constr., Inc., 135 W. Va. 739, 750, 65 S.E.2d 87, 94 (1951);
Allen v. Raleigh-Wyoming Mining Co., 117 W. Va. 631, 635-36, 186 S.E. 612, 614 (1936);
Maynard v. Island Creek Coal Co., 115 W. Va. 249, 252, 175 S.E. 70, 72 (1934). An employer
now may negligently violate a safety statute without specific intent to injure and face liability
through a risk-analysis. See text accompanying notes 74-78 supra. Thus, in practice, the
probability standard set forth in Manolidis may result in strict liability for employers who
violate safety regulations.

u Manolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc.,

-

W. Va. _,

246 S.E.2d 907, 913-14 (1978).

West Virginia courts accepted and applied the Allen specific intent construction for
over forty years. The court had two prior opportunities to modify the Allen construction yet
226 S.E.2d 259 (1976); Brewer v.
W. Va. _
declined to do so. Eisnaugle v. Booth, Appalachian Constr., Inc., 135 W. Va. 739, 65 S.E.2d 87 (1951). Indeed, the Brewer and
Eisnauglecourts went so far as to extend the application of the immunity provision to include
cases in which the employer engaged in willful or wanton misconduct. See note 84 supra.
The plaintiff in Brewer was injured when a gasoline storage tank overflowed, caught fire
and exploded, causing the detonation of illegally stored explosives. Brewer v. Appalachain
Constr., Inc., 135 W. Va. 739, 741-42, 65 S.E.2d 87, 89-90 (1951). The plaintiff alleged that
the employer, with knowledge of the attendant circumstances, sent the plaintiff into an
adjacent structure to attempt to salvage equipment deliberately intending to kill or injure
the plaintiff. Id. at 742, 65 S.E.2d at 90. While acknowledging that the facts constituted
negligence, the court found the plaintiff's allegations of intent merely conclusory and refused
to imply the deliberate intent necessary to overcome the limited employer immunity. Id. at
750, 65 S.E.2d at 94. The defendant in Eisnaugle injured the plaintiff by striking him with
"

his automobile in their employer's parking lot. Eisnaugle v. Booth,

-

W. Va.

__,

226

S.E.2d 259, 260 (1976). Since the workmen's compensation statutes covered the plaintiff's
injuries, the exclusive remedy provision barred him from bringing suit against the defendant
even though the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the accident. Id. at_, 226 S.E.2d
at 261.
Many other jurisdictions have held previously that willful and deliberate violations of
reasonable safety precautions which result in an employee's injury do not constitute a deliberate intent to injure. See, e.g., Haggar v. Wartz Biscuit Co., 210 Ark. 318, _ 196 S.W.2d
240 P.2d 1013, 1014 (1952); Southern
1, 3-4 (1946); Law v. Dartt, 109 Cal. App.2d 508, -,
Wire & Iron Co. v. Fowler, 217 Ga. 727, _ , 124 S.E.2d 738, 740-41 (1962); Duncan v. Perry
Packing Co., 162 Kan. 79, _ , 174 P.2d 78, 83 (1946); Kenner v. Henreco, 161 So. 2d 142,
143 (La. App. 1964); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Reyes, 75 Nev. 212, _ , 337 P.2d 151, 53
131 A.2d 151, 53 (1959); Bryan v. Jeffers, 103
(1959); Wilkinson v. Achber, 101 N.H. 7, -,
N.J. Super 522,-., 248 A.2d 129, 130 (1968); Finch v. Swingley, 42 App. Div.2d 1035, 1035,
348 N.Y.S.2d 266, 267-68 (1973); Roberts v. Barclay, 369 P.2d 808, 810 (Okla. 1962); Heikkila
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tors may question the equity underlying the exclusive remedy provision of
workmen's compensation statutes," the Manolidis decision represents a
wholly inappropriate intrusion by the court into the legislative sphere."
9
Not only does the decision reject stare decisis"
and violate clear legislative
intent," but it also displays the court's lack of concern for the disruptive
effects that such a radical change may engender. The lucrative damages
of common law tort claims virtually invite employees to prosecute actions
for all injuries involving the violation of safety statutes.9' The res judicata
effects of workmen's compensation settlements" may force employers to
litigate such claims on the issue of liability where the possibility of a
common law suit on the injury is present. The increased numbers of claim
contests and litigation may overwhelm the administrative machinery
which must handle these disputes, resulting in delays and increased costs
to state government.
The economic consequences of the Manolidis ruling may spur swift
legislative reaction. Although employers remain liable for statutory contributions to the workmen's compensation fund, Manolidis erodes at least a
portion of the immunity upon which the contributions are based. Employers now face the legal expenses of defending many common law actions"
v. Ewen Transfer Co., 297 P. 373, 374 (Or. 1931); Evans v. Allentown-Portland Cement Co.,
433 Pa. 595, ____ 252 A.2d 646, 647 (1969); Steele v. Eaton, 130 Vt. 1, _,
285 A.2d 749,
751 (1971).
" See Manolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., W. Va. _
, 246 S.E.2d 907, 913 (1978);
ProvidingFor The Victims?, supra note 23, at 97.
" See Maynard v. Island Creek Coal Co., 115 W. Va. 249, 252, 175 S.E. 70, 72 (1934);
note 54 supra.
" See note 86 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 43-53 supra.
11See Manolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., W. Va. __ 246 S.E.2d 907, 922-23 (1978)
(Neely, J., dissenting).
12 Findings on any relevant issue in a workmen's compensation proceeding are res judicata in subsequent actions at law. 3 LARSON, supra note 1, at § 79.71. See, e.g., Drier v.
Randforce Amusement Corp., 14 Misc. 2d 362, 364, 179 N.Y.S.2d 412, 416 (1958) (issue
involved the nature of the injury); Smith v. General Motors Corp., 63 F. Supp. 101, 103 (E.D.
Mo. 1945) (cause of employee's death); Ayers v. Genter, 367 Mich. 675, 117 N.W.2d 38, 40
(1962) (the existence of the employment relationship); Skelly Oil Co. v. District Ct., 401 P.2d
526, 527 (Okla. 1964); Shoopman v. Calvo, 63 Wash.2d 627, -,
388 P.2d 559, 560 (1964)
(whether the accident arose from the course of employment). Thus, if an employer believes
that a particular claim may form the basis for a common law action, the employer will be
reluctant to settle the claim because of potential res judicata effects in later proceedings. See
Farm Bureau Brief, supra note 45, at 16-17. See also Demler, Remedy for the Intentional
Torts of a Workmen's Compensation Carrier,1 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 54, 67-68 (1973).
0 See note 92 supra.
" In cases where a court grants summary judgment at the close of the plaintiffs casein-chief, the defendant already will have incurred considerable legal expenses. The employer
must pay counsel while the *plaintiffengages in discovery, even when the claim is not ultimately litigated. One purpose of the workmen's compensation statutes is to relieve employers
from the burden of defending numerous tort claims. See Maynard v. Island Creek Coal Co.,
115 W. Va. 249, 252, 175 S.E. 70, 71 (1934). A system which forces upon employers the
aggravation and expense of defending each claim arising from a safety violation is contrary
to such a purpose.
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which previously were disposed of summarily by trial courts." Although a
single tort award may force a small company into bankruptcy, with concomitant effects on employment and local economies, large industries may
be able to pass these costs on to the consumer in part." Such a system calls
into question the propriety of unlimited punitive recoveries and may seriously damage industrial development in West Virginia.
The legislatures of several states have adopted alternatives to the imposition of unlimited common law liability when an employer's willful safety
violation results in injuries to workers. 7 These statutes generally provide
for the assessment of an additional percentage of workmen's compensation
payments against employers guilty of such violations." The workmen's
compensation bureau may assess such a penalty against the guilty employer and award the funds to the accident victim during the course of the
standard administrative proceedings. Since the workmen's compensation
fund does not cover such additional awards, the payment penalizes only
the offending employer. Thus, such statutes effect the same result as the
Manolidis decision by encouraging compliance with safety regulations and
providing additional compensation to employee accident victims without
exposing employers to unlimited tort liability.

Wunj m R. GOODELL
,s See note 22 supra.

"See Manolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc.,
(Neely, J., dissenting).

-

W. Va. _

246 S.E.2d 907, 923 (1978)

0 See note 3 supra.

" Different statutory schemes provide for the additional assessment of different percentages of the workmen's compensation award. North Carolina permits an additional ten percent penalty to be assessed an employer, N. C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12 (Cum. Supp. 1977), while
California permits a fifty percent assessment. CAL. LAB. CODE § 4553 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
Ohio provides a flexible system by giving discretion to the workmen's compensation board
to assess a penalty between fifteen and fifty percent of the compensation payments. Osno
CONST. art II, § 35 (Page 1955). See generally note 3 supra.

